

History and Existence in Husserl's Manuscripts

by
Giovanni Piana

English Translation
by Anthony Roda

“Telos”

October 13
1972

Editor: *Paul Piccone*

Managing Editor: *Patricia Tummons*

Review Editor: *Paul Breines*

Production Staff: *Elias Vlanton, Thomas Hull, Ben Mijuskovic,
James Watson*

Editorial Associates: *Andrew Arato, Robert D'Amico, Silvia
Federici, Andrew Feenberg, Frederic Fleron,
Lou Jean Fleron, Bart Grahl, David Gross,
Dick Howard, Russell Jacoby, Michael Kosok
William Leiss, Lee Smith, Ernest Yanarella*

by

Giovanni Piana

I.

"There can be no stronger realism than this, if by this word nothing more is meant than: 'I am certain of being a human being who lives in this world, etc., and I doubt it not in the least.' But the great problem is precisely to understand what is here so 'obvious'." – Husserl, *Crisis*¹

The theme of this work is Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, and it must be introduced by elaborating the phenomenological program to the *critique of reason*. In dealing with certain issues approached from many directions of contemporary thought, we must not lose sight of its primary motivation, i.e., the problem of a valid foundation for philosophical knowledge. We will try to investigate the theoretical genesis of the theme along the lines that lead from the crisis of thought in the naturalistic attitude, exemplified by scepticism and solipsism, to critical reflection. Such a posing of the problem will allow us to show from the very beginning that the overcoming of scepticism is a function of the solution of the solipsistic objection.²

"With the awakening of reflection about the relation of cognition to its object, abysmal difficulties arise. Cognition, the thing most taken for granted in natural thinking, suddenly emerges as a mystery."³ The presence of the being which I investigate is indubitable: the object is there if I see it, if I succeed in

*Originally published as *Storia ed Esistenza nei Manoscritti di Husserl*, Lampugnani-Nigri Editore (Milan, 1965). This work is the result of a study conducted in the Husserl Archives in Freiburg: date of writing and length of the manuscripts cited will be given in footnotes. English translation by Anthony Roda.

1. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill., 1970), p. 187.

2. On the problem of the "critique of reason and phenomenology", see Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phaenomenologie, Fuenf Vorlesungen (1907)*, hrsg. von W. Biemel (The Hague, 1950) – hereafter referred to as *Idee* – translated into English as *The Idea of Phenomenology* by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague, 1964) – hereafter referred to as *Idea* – and the lecture "Kant und die Idee der Tranzendentalphilosophie" (1924), in Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie*, vol. I, "Kritische Ideengeschichte", hrsg. von R. Boehm (The Hague, 1959), pp. 230-287, hereafter referred to as *Erste Philosophie I*.

3. *Idee*, p. 19; *Idea*, pp. 14-15.

perceiving it, and in grasping it by the use of various simple or complex instruments of investigation. If I make a mistake and if in repeating the experiences, what is given as experienced turns out to be illusory, I shall be able to improve the instruments of verification, by developing other approaches, etc. On this level, in which the object is naturally and directly given to knowledge, the problem of the *possibility* of knowing does not arise.⁴ I know and that is enough. To pose the question: "How *can* I know what I see in front of me" seems to run against "common sense". The sceptics' argument leads to this "absurd" problem. It appeals to the hypothesis of an unsuspectable deceit and goes on to maintain the truth of the hypothesis, forcing natural knowledge into a continuous self-verification. The seriousness of this game appears in the implicit request to discuss the indisputability of the fact that, in general, "I know": what is asked for is a guarantee in principle which justifies the validity of my actual as well as of every possible knowledge. The sceptic who seeks to develop his scepticism into a systematic theoretical elaboration runs necessarily into constant contradictions. But the positive need that he consciously or unconsciously brings out is that of a critical foundation of knowledge as such.

Reading Hume stimulates Kant to realize the imposing project of a critique of reason: for Husserl this has an exemplary meaning. Hume proceeds so carefully and penetratingly in his investigation that he brings to light the paradox of knowledge based on the naturalistic attitude, the enigma of the encounter between the immanent operation of cognition and the transcendence of the object: "All cognition of the natural sort, especially the prescientific, is cognition which makes its object transcendent. It posits objects as existent, claims to reach matters of fact which are not 'strictly given to it,' are not 'immanent' to it."⁵ Hume shows that transcendence can be reduced to the level of a *fiction*, and knowledge, although remaining what it is, can no longer justify itself through its object.

Even if we avoid the absurd construction of elevating scepticism to a negative system of truth, we must accept the sceptical criticism of the natural attitude. We simply cannot assume as valid the knowledge of the sciences given through the natural attitude.⁶ This oversight on the part of "science" is based on the more general questioning of the indubitability of the very being of the "world". For scepticism that would mean: this world, which seems so concrete and so real, may be a dream. Engaged in the polemic with natural dogmatism, scepticism is only an indication of its crisis and remains open to a new and yet more paradoxical theoretical dogmatism. It is blind to the fact that its great discovery lies precisely in the *reduction of the transcendent to immanent givenness*. This discovery can remove it from the natural attitude and introduce it on the path of a fully founded knowledge. Husserl points to the *reduction* as the operation that makes possible the intuitive description of what is seen as such—as given purely to "consciousness" and therefore "true" in the only sense that meets the sceptical challenge. For him, the *fiction* becomes the pure

4. *Idee*, pp. 17-19; *Idea*, pp. 13-15.

5. *Idee*, p. 34; *Idea*, p. 27.

6. *Idee*, p. 36; *Idea*, pp. 28-29.

visibility of the given: the phenomenon. If I suspend the thesis of existence and consider reality as phenomenon, the transcendent itself is eliminated: what matters now is the modality of the connection between "consciousness" and its object. Dealing with this connection does not imply, rather, it excludes, the transcendent assumption of the object towards which "consciousness" transcends itself: "relating-itself-to-transcendent-things, whether it is meant in this or that way, is still an inner feature of the phenomenon."⁷ By radically accepting the sceptical proposal we come to the intentional consideration of being. If the *intentionality* of the relation remains concealed, the sceptic will maintain that he has demonstrated the theoretical confusion between reality and fiction. Although he has undertaken a critique of the natural concept of transcendence, in fact he presupposes it even if only as an epistemologically negative limit.

Through the reduction to the level of phenomenon, the distinction between immanent and transcendent does not disappear but is rigorously upheld in a complete reformulation: rather, what is eliminated is the naive assumption of the in-itself. The concept of being in itself is a pre-philosophical concept developed within the naturalistic reflection. Phenomenology rejects "naïve realism" which is forced to seek a guarantee of its own scientificity in the sciences based on the natural attitude. Yet, "authentic transcendental philosophy, which emphasizes decision from the beginning, is neither openly nor covertly like Humean philosophy, a decomposition of consciousness of the world nor of the world itself in fiction, hence, as one says today, a 'philosophy of the *as if*'. Nor is it a 'dissolution' of the world into 'mere subjective apparitions' which can have reference to appearance in any sense."⁸

"Let us recall Descartes' argument from doubt. Reflecting upon the multiple possibilities of error and of illusion it is possible that I fall into sceptical despair, which ends with the statement: nothing is certain for me, everything is open to doubt. But soon it is evident that for me everything cannot be open to doubt, from the moment that I make this judgment — that for me everything is open to doubt — it is certain that I make this judgment and it would be a contradiction to pretend to maintain a universal doubt. And in every case of determined doubt, it is undoubtedly certain that I doubt in this determined manner. The same is so for every cogitatio."⁹ For Husserl this traditional philosophical argument is significant not merely because it expresses the indubitability of the principle of "self-consciousness", but rather because of the truth of the seeing and of the seen considered as intentionally connected. This is why the Cartesian title of *ego cogito* does not designate the premise of a deductive discourse, but, rather, indicates the methodological a priori of description. "It is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common, misunderstanding, to seek to attack transcendental phenomenology as 'Cartesianism'.¹⁰ Certainly, it becomes essential

7. *Idee*, p. 46; *Idea*, p. 36.

8. *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 246.

9. *Idee*, p. 30; *Idea*, p. 23. For the meaning of the *cogito*, see Enzo Paci, *Tempo e Verità nella Fenomenologia di Husserl* (Bari, 1961), pp. 65 ff.

10. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, op.cit., p. 189.

for phenomenology to deepen the meaning of the subjective pole of the relation. I must proceed to determine the meaning contents of the *ego* in order to clarify what must be understood as phenomenological description. In fact, it seems that by means of the phenomenological reduction one can attain, emerging from the natural attitude and from scepticism, knowledge based on an autonomous and valid foundation. This is now for us only the "who" of the intentional relation: neither a "thinking thing" nor a "human-I". However, before clarifying this, we are faced with a principled objection: if the object of phenomenological knowledge is essentially referred to a subjective pole, either this knowledge reduces to mere privateness thus renouncing any objective validity or, if it pretends to be objective, it must produce transcendences, thus reintroducing doubt, against its own assumption.¹¹ The problem of the "objectivity" of knowledge is not only analogous but it is a consequence of that of transcendence. For thought based on the naturalistic attitude, actual or possible knowledge of the in-itself is truth in-itself. We find ourselves again in trouble only if the critiques of the natural concept of the knowledge of transcendence does not follow the critiques of the natural concept of transcendence. But it makes no sense to compare the naive objectivity of knowledge and the subjectivity of phenomenological discourse. In the intentional perspective "subjective" and "private" do not coincide and objectivity as validity for "others" remains to be explained. Here it is possible to raise a second and more serious objection on principle: what can the expression "the others" mean for us if, after the reduction, we only know of a pure non-human disembodied, unique, and absolute subjectivity? Are we not perhaps trapped in *solipsism* the moment we attempt a description of the field outlined by the *ego cogito* considered as the "who" of the intentional relation?

The phenomenological exercise of the *epochē* has led me to the suspension of all that belongs to the already given: i.e., of all that I know as already valid about others, and from others, of the human world as the world which, in the evolution of its history, I know to be one and the same for all. With its claim of absoluteness, isn't phenomenological knowledge nothing other than an empty solipsistic discourse? This objection, which is reiterated as if it were able to theoretically refute phenomenology, must be clarified and comprehended in its internal meaning.

The proposition "the world is" (*Die Welt ist*) – which immediately implies the assertion of my existence and that of others in the world – may be considered as the fundamental thesis of the realistic pre-conception which daily experience and *praxis* have always presupposed. Dealing now with this formulation, we obtain a new positing of the critique of the natural attitude, which identifies solipsism as an aspect of scepticism and at the same time the meaningful margin that it entails for philosophical reflection. Does the indubitability of the thesis concerning the existence of the world, obvious for the natural attitude, express an apodictic certainty? Something is beyond doubt if "nothing speaks against it": but cognition is truly apodictic only if in principle

11. *Idee*, p. 49; *Idea*, pp. 38-39.

it excludes the possibility of not being about the known.¹² The thesis concerning the existence of the world does not have this character of apodicticity: the contingency of the proposition "the world is" can be refuted because every fact (*Faktum*) is contingent and the world is a fact.¹³ The certainty of the existence of the world which we assume and in which "we believe" is solely empirical: "Nothing speaks in favor of the non-existence of the world, everything speaks in favor of its existence."¹⁴ Yet the opposite thesis concerning the non-existence of the world is not self-contradictory: I could think that the harmonic style of experience which gives me the world as existent is altogether wrong. The insane can say: "the world does not exist." The objection to realism is "the objection of insanity."¹⁵ We can stop with this outcome, thus getting rid of this inconvenient inconsistency with "common sense" without difficulty: we thus appeal to normality and to the validity for all by rejecting the insane in his own solitude. But here is where the problem lies: only if we hold firm to the natural ground of communicative attitude, we remain and judge within the norm. My style of experience whereby there is a world for me coincides with the style of the experience of others and its eventual partial modification can be without difficulty interpreted in reference to communal normality. But in the hypothesis of a total modification, which takes away all horizons of belief, I have no norm at my disposal: for me the world and others are mere fictions.

It is necessary to place oneself in absolute solitude: only I am apodictically indubitable. The experiences of others must be evaluated no differently than my own experiences: they are *experiences of my experiences* and nothing more. I must remove myself from the communicative attitude insofar as it presupposes the existence of others, real or possible, and therefore pass from a discourse implicating the *us* (*Wir-Rede*) to a purely egological (*Ich-Rede*) discourse.¹⁶ Even though the solipsist has undertaken an apodictic criticism of the natural experience of the world, he has not grasped the meaning of his reduction: his reflection remains naive just like the result which he believes he reaches.¹⁷ On the other hand, we point out the groundlessness of naive realism and by reducing to appearance the world, and the others in it, we interpret the appearance itself in a transcendental way as pure phenomenological givenness. Therefore, we accept the hypothesis of the illusoriness of the world but we recognize its nature as "mere hypothesis." Husserl reproaches Descartes for not having realized that the doubt arising from the possible illusoriness of experienced data cannot be extended to "really" shake the certainty of the world.¹⁸ Thus, we necessarily

12. Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie*, vol. II, "Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion", hrsg. von R. Boehm (The Hague, 1959), p. 54; hereafter referred to as *Erste Philosophie II*.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 50 and 53.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

18. "Isn't the peculiarity of the certainty of the world precisely in this: that, in

find ourselves in solipsism, but we consciously take it to be a device, a mental experiment (*Gedankenexperiment*),¹⁹ a fiction.²⁰ Certainly, methodical solipsism soon poses more than one problem, but it cannot be resolved by appealing to the obvious and ordinary daily being and the certainty that it entails. Rather, what is needed is the constitutive foundation of otherness, on the basis of a phenomenological apodicticity which is disclosed by the very sceptic-solipsistic requirement. Precisely because the phenomenological method places importance of the solipsistic doubt it posits the theme of intersubjectivity as its necessary task.²¹

II.

In following the main lines of Husserl's theory of *Einfuehlung* — the group of analyses meant to describe the experience of subjective otherness — we must emphasize the fact that in doing so, we are constantly moving on a transcendental ground: the other is given as a phenomenon among other phenomena of the descriptive sphere outlined by the reduction to the *ego cogito*. We are not in the mere "empirical existence" where the other is already there

its way, it remains even in its apodicticity, notwithstanding all the real and possible doubts with respect to a given situation? And that it cannot be arbitrarily destroyed, although the single realities, always in the single real situation, could be doubted and even too often they undergo a transformation of validity by passing from being to appearance?

"Descartes has not considered this fact and, naturally, he has not seen the problems that referred to it and which had to arise from the adoption of his (correctly understood) discovery. Thus, it is impossible to talk about a really universal doubt concerning the world; but what remains of his method, his essential merit, is an *epoche* of the being of the entire world (for Descartes motivated by the universal possibility of doubt as the possibility of the world's non-being)." Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phaenomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phaenomenologische Philosophie*, hrsg. von Walter Biemel (The Hague, 1954). Unfortunately, the English translation has omitted this important section.

19. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer Phaenomenologie und phaenomenologischen Philosophie*, hrsg. von W. Biemel (The Hague, 1952), p. 81.

20. *Erste Philosophie II*, *op.cit.*, p. 177.

21. Concerning the history of the problem within the development of Husserl's thought, we must limit ourselves to the following few hints: in the semester of Winter 1910-1911, Husserl held a seminar in Gottingen on "The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology", in which, for the first time, he dealt with the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity. (Cf. *Erste Philosophie II*, p. 433, n. 3.) In the 1907 lectures (*Idee, Idea, op.cit.*) the reduction is not yet extended to intersubjectivity, and the problem of subjective otherness is not even posed. Commenting upon this later, Husserl observes that they contained an "error in principle". (Cf. *Erste Philosophie II*, p. 433.) In the period from 1910 to 1929 (*Cartesian Meditations*) the problem of intersubjectivity is gradually elaborated, yet, it is already worked out in its essential outline around the period 1923-1924 (in *Erste Philosophie*).

22. Apparently the term *Einfuehlung* was introduced into the German

and, therefore, there is no need to constitute him.²³ If we posit the problem of his constitution, this is because the "empirical" assumption is not yet meaningful by itself. Our problem is of understanding in its own meaning, free from every metaphysical hypothesis and from all obviousness, the presence to me of the other as a being subjectively foreign: "We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense "other ego" becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own manner."²⁴

The transcendental constitution of the other as such is basic for every formation of being-there-for-everyone, therefore of "objectivity" in the broad sense, of the world as nature and culture. Through it, one must come to "a universal history in the sense that emanating from within, it renders possible for me in particular the objective world."²⁵

The "bracketing" required for an adequate thematization of subjective otherness applies to all subjects which present themselves as strangers and the formations which imply otherness, directly or indirectly. This special reductive operation aims at defining what belongs *first and foremost* to the *I* in order to eventually come to a positive explication of the experience of the other in its originality. Initial solipsism is brought to the extreme limit because the bracketing is now turned to extraneous intentional meanings in their own reduced phenomenal form.

The reduction of the objective sciences and of the world leads to the *ego cogito* as the transcendental field of phenomena: the world is still given to the ego as a phenomenon and in it are found the others and the intersubjective meaning formations, but only under the prefix "as if".²⁶ The universal sphere of

philosophical dictionary by Herder, and Husserl probably got it from Theodor Lipps' *Asthetik*. At any rate, it was a common word in contemporary philosophical culture – thus provided with quite a broad meaning which must be periodically specified further. Husserl takes it in this general breadth to indicate the whole of intentional acts aimed at otherness. The proposed translations so far are many and almost always questionable especially when it is attempted to give it a unique pregnant meaning that it does not have. This does not mean, as it is claimed following Scheler, that Husserl has divested the term of every emotional content. It only means that feeling for Husserl is only one mode of the *Einfuehlung*.

23. Cf. Manuscript C-11-V, p. 7. This manuscript is 19 pages long, and was originally written by Husserl in December 1931.

24. Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague, 1967), p. 90.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93. [The English translation has not been used here, owing to equivocation as to what the original German should read. At a crucial point, Cairns prefers to read "Sinnesschichte" (layers of meaning), while Piana reads "Sinngeschichte" (history of sense). This, of course, renders the English translation virtually useless for reference here. – Ed.]

26. *Ibid.*

being has become a correlative phenomenon to the pure transcendental ego. When I carry out a further *epochē* on the meaning "other", the ego is returned to its "propriety", i.e., to the *transcendental and concrete I itself*.²⁷ Deprived of every subjective intention besides mine, i.e., of all that which can be subsumed under "culture", the "world" is *only* my world but, for the same reason, it is also *only* "nature". *Nature itself (eigenheitliche Natur)* is not "Mere nature" as the object of "science" which still holds, even though it is obtained by abstracting from every human-cultural meaning, the character of being-there-for-everyone, of objectivity. Rather, it is essentially perception, i.e., the intentional connection between living perceiving corporeality and perceived objectivity.

The reduction of transcendental subjectivity to "my" being of the subject, reveals its original natural character: its essential being in and for a body. Living and perceiving corporeality is original because of the fact that it is the ultimate domain which I reach through the reductive process brought to the limit: it is the foundation of every possible experience of the world.²⁸ It is, so to say, the sphere of absolute "solipsism", or, in Husserlian terminology, the sphere of *primordinality* or egological primordiality:²⁹ that which is absolutely first in my being as an I, and thus not yet an "I-man", but "pure and simple sensibility".³⁰ What makes the I an I is not an empty essence, but *first and foremost* the perceiving operating of the body.

The reduction to the primordial leads to an internal outlining of the subjective pole of the intentional relation, thus immediately proposing a thematic negatively contraposed to the *other*. Furthermore, it makes possible the theme of the spatio-temporal constitution of "nature" by demanding for it a purely perceptual foundation.³¹ It is also clear that, because of the domain of perception through which it has been obtained, it must not be understood as a field of absolute immediacy. The constitution of the other, precisely because it shatters the solipsism of perception on the perceptual level, must necessarily introduce new and complex considerations which emphasize the moment of mediation, both in relation to "nature" and to the human world, i.e., "culture".

Something like *another living body*, a body itself perceived as a subject of perception, is given in the field of perception. It does not resolve itself in mere being present: if such were the case, it would not really be *another* for me, nor would it be a *living body*. Original and direct experience is limited to self-perception of "my" body and to the perception of the mere materiality of

27. We translate "*Eigenheit*" simply as "propriety". Often it is translated as "belonging". For the expression "transcendental and concrete I-itself", cf. *ibid.*, p. 93.

28. *Cartesian Meditations, op.cit.*, pp. 95-96.

29. The term "primordial" is typical of the fifth Cartesian Meditation. In the manuscripts Husserl uses more often "primordial"; occasionally he also uses "primordium". Cf. Manuscript C-16-VII, p. 14. (This Manuscript is 18 pages long and was written in May 1933.) This primordial world is also called "*Die 'erste' Welt*", in Manuscript D-12-IV (34 pages long and written in 1931).

30. *Cartesian Meditations, op.cit.*, p. 145.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

perceived bodies: what makes the body perceptively given as "animated" and as "other" is not itself present (*selbst-da*), but co-present (*mit-da*). We designate the intentional perceptive act which brings to givenness the other as such by the term *appresentation*.³² "In the perception given in effective originality, I have only the corporeality of the other. If I say: 'this man is present in flesh and blood' precisely what renders him a person, what 'animates' this material body by conferring upon it the meaning of living body, is not originally perceived. It is co-present, presentified and rendered intuitive, but it is not 'present' in actual originality (as is my own egological being): it is originally given only as 'co-present' (not in a mere indirect presumption, as by hearsay, etc.)."³³ The fact that the experience of the other is not presenting but appresenting indicates only that the other is primordially present in a radical transcendence.³⁴ nonetheless, the *other itself* is in my perceptive horizon. In a manuscript presumably written during the same period as the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl speaks of the "originality of appresentation." "My 'perception' of others is the original self-giving of other men: the originality where their psychic being, together with their body immediately given to me, is the originality of appresentation, which consequently becomes legitimized in the synthesis of a progressive and increasingly more complete, i.e., self-confirming experience."³⁵ Let us now attempt a more precise determination of the difference between perception of a thing and perception of otherness (*estraneità*), and therefore of their different modalities of verification (*Bewahrung*). The concept of appresentation pertains even in the interpretation of the perception of a thing. The immediately perceived, i.e., what is directly presence, implies a horizon of appresence.³⁶ The appresenting act here presupposes an intention which can be "filled" through a proper change of location of the perceiving subject. What is appresented becomes directly present if I change position and look at the object "from the back." But the *other* is not behind his body, so as to present itself entirely if I go around him.³⁷ For me, the verification of the other's being is not a

32. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

33. Manuscript A-V-5, pp. 223-224. This manuscript is 259 pages long and was written at different times from 1920 to 1933.

34. "Personal otherness represents a much more advanced transcendence than that of inanimate things." Cf. E. Melandri, *Logica e Esperienza in Husserl* (Bologna, 1961), p. 207. In the theory of the *Fremderfahrung* it is not at all a matter of "minimizing" the distance between ego and alter-ego as Rene Toulemont has observed, in passing, in his *L'essence de la société selon Husserl* (Paris, 1962), p. 55, but only of understanding the meaning of this distance.

35. Cf. Manuscript A-V-10/2, pp. 155 and 208 where Husserl uses the expression "secondary originality" of the *Einfuehlung* in contraposition to primordial *Selbsterfahrung*. This manuscript is 134 pages long, and was written between 1920 and 1930.

36. For the notions of *Urpraesenz* and *Appraesenz*, see Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und phaenomenologische Philosophie* Band II, "Phaenomenologischen Untersuchungen zur Konstitution", hrsg. von W. Biemel (The Hague, 1952), pp. 162 ff.

37. Cf. Manuscript A-V-5, p. 166.

function of the synthetic identification of the experienced unity through the reiteration of adumbrating experiences, as is the case with the perception of a thing: "In a certain sense, the apprehension of the man goes through the phenomenon of the body, which is here *living body*. It does not stop, so to say, near the body; its arrow does not aim towards it nor towards a spirit connected to it, but 'goes behind' and is directed precisely at the man."³⁸

The apprehension of the man does not proceed from the body to the soul in a succession as if the mere body were given at *first* and *then* the entire person. For this same reason the entire body of the other does not necessarily present itself to me so that I can have this apprehension: a part presupposes the whole.³⁹ The perceptive appresentation or *apperception* necessarily intervenes both in the case of the perception of the thing, as well as in the case of the perception of the other. Yet, the terms and meanings which enter into the apperceptive relation are different.

Apperception in general means "an apprehension of the being in a mode consonant to that which is already similar for me."⁴⁰ The body of the other primordially experienced is not given as a mere material body, but as subjective organ "analogous" to the body in which "my" egological living obtains. Since this experience falls within the sphere of propriety, I must conclude that the meaning of living corporeality which I experience as *other* is constituted by departing from the living body which I originally experience as specifically *my-own*: the living corporeality of the other is given in an *analogical apperception*.⁴¹ And it must be added that only in this apperception do I recognize, with the body of the other, my body as my own: the experience of the other implies a reciprocal perceptive recognition, i.e., an associative

38. *Ideen*, vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 240.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

40. Cf. Manuscript D-12-IV, p. 25.

41. For *analogische Apperzeption* and *veraehnlichende Apperzeption*, see *Cartesian Meditations*, *op.cit.*, p. 108. The equivocations regarding the nature of this "analogizing" act are well known. Among the first, it was Max Scheler to interpret the Husserlian analogy as mere intellectual comparison. Against Scheler, Husserl clearly asserts that analogical apperception is not reasoning by analogy, nor a syllogism, nor a mental act. A similar miscomprehension can be found in Alfred Schutz when he writes that: "Husserl's assumption that an analogical apprehension of an Other's living body takes place on the basis of a similarity to my own living body contradicts the phenomenological finding that my living body 'stands out' in my primordial perceptual field in a manner which is fundamentally different from the manner in which the allegedly similar body of the Other stands out in this field." Cf. *Collected Papers*, vol. III, "Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy", ed. by I. Schutz (The Hague, 1966), pp. 63-64. In the same essay we also find the objection of the "man that we meet in the subway" which we often like to refer to: "It must also be asked whether in fact the bodily appearance of the Other in my primordial sphere has the decisive significance which Husserl ascribes to it. I empathize much more with a philosopher spatially and temporally distant than with my neighbor in the subway who is given to me in person (*leibhaftig*), but a stranger (*Fremder*)." *Ibid.*, p. 81.

identification of perceiving subjects. In the perception of a thing, on the other hand, the perceptive-apperceptive process identifies the thing with itself by determining and estranging it in its objective transcendence: "The living body is experienced according to the apperception of my own living body. It seems simply a matter of dealing with the apperception of the similar through what is previously experienced as similar, in a way consonant with it. Yet, that does not occur as in a field already constituted of things outside of me, when I certainly transfer apperceptively what I know about a thing to another similar to it. Initially, my body does not have any similar body. It arrives at that only through a new kind of apperception of the living body, which already presupposes the apperception of the external thing, but modifies it in a new kind of apperception."⁴²

In the apprehension of the other, the intentionality of the perceptive act is not directed to catch the mere externality of the body, but its *expressivity*: "Other I's, men and animals, are first of all experienced as bodies in the world, but as 'expressing' and appresenting a conscious life alien to me."⁴³ The expressiveness of the body is its gestual operating. The certainty of the other's being is based upon the continual and consonant verification of *gestuality* (behavior) of the body of the other.⁴⁴ In the process of my experiencing directed to the "thing", I verify it constantly in its previously anticipated givenness, in its being as it is and in the 'circumstances' which condition and characterize it: "But to the extent that a person has a general style that offers a trace to the association and to the extent that it lives in circumstances and in reference to them, it upholds its own identity, not through mere circumstances, but through its own behavior (*Verhalten*) in them: it outlines what it will do and how it will behave in so doing. A person cannot be constructed. Its individuality can only be recognized from the actual unfolding of its behavior — even if within an essential form which cannot be gone beyond."⁴⁵

42. Cf. Manuscript D-12-IV, pp. 26-27.

43. Cf. Manuscript A-VI-23, p. 11; this manuscript was written February 13, 1932, and it is 14 pages long. For corporeality as *Ausdruck*, cf. *Ideen*, vol. II, *op.cit.*, pp. 234 ff. Husserl occasionally uses also the term *Indikation* (cf. *Erste Philosophie I, op.cit.*, p. 187); *altruistische Indikation* (cf. Manuscript A-V-5, p. 32) and *Indizierung* (cf. Manuscript A-VI-20, pp. 44-45, 65 pages long and written between 1928 and 1929).

44. For gestuality as *Meinenspiel*, cf. *Ideen* vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 253. For behavior as *Gebaren*, cf. *Cartesian Meditations, op.cit.* "Gebaren is Husserl's 'behavior' which, in a certain sense, is original and pre-predicative with respect to the behavior of the behaviorists." Enzo Paci, *Tempo e Verità nella Fenomenologia di Husserl, op.cit.*, p. 147.

45. Manuscript A-V-5, p. 34. The knowledge of the other as a person cannot derive from a mere inductive expectation (Manuscript A-V-5, p. 35). Constantly dissatisfied with the terminology connected with the theme of intersubjectivity, Husserl also speaks occasionally of *Induktion* (cf. Manuscript A-VI-20, p. 44; in the margin, however, we find added "Induction is a bad word"), but he underlines that, while the experience of the physical object is inductive, in the case of the other I can speak of induction only in an improper sense: I can say

Since the external aspect of the other is understood as behavior, my comprehension is *internal* to the sense that it grasps externality as subjectively motivated. In the term "understanding", the nature of the comprehensive act is not yet established: whether it is essentially theoretical or affective. This problem, around which much has been written, does not exist in any form. Yet, we distinguish between reflective and pre-reflective *Einfuehlung*: the first always "presupposes" the second.⁴⁶ Perceptive *Einfuehlung* has a transcendental priority: there are then infinite modified modalities, which remain to be described from time to time. There is always an *interest*⁴⁷ guiding my intentional attention, so that the modes of comprehension are to be phenomenologically differentiated in correlation to my always different mode of being interested: "The other is experienced in such a way that I am 'absorbed in him' always because of some interest. In the appresentation through which he is experienced as a bodily person in my perceptual world, rather, in my actual spatial field of the perceptual present, I live his life with him. In general, he is present to me in a way of even being appresented as a person with a personal life. Yet, the appresentation, as when one looks in passing, may remain altogether inactive in a complete lack of transparence and distinction, even if he – lacking interests in me – remains nonetheless in the background. If the appresentation is activated and operates as if in an active interest, then it is a co-feeling *to and in the other person*, almost a living with it. His experiencing, his thinking, evaluating and operating is found in the presentificating appresentation according to the modes in which from time to time it is determined."⁴⁸

The fact that the other is in my perceptual field and I in his, still does not mean that we are reciprocally perceiving each other as perceivers.⁴⁹ It can happen that I see the other without knowing whether he has seen me or not. I can observe him without he becoming aware of it and vice versa. The presence of the other can be given to me while I am not directed towards it in an explicit *Einfuehlung*. On the other hand, I am explicitly directed towards the other, I catch his manifestations and I eventually comprehend him as explicitly directed towards my manifestations, or to my being directed towards him: "For example, while he observes me in some interest, he can also think that I remain unaware, perhaps because I act as if I were not aware and avoid any expression that would

that in the *Einfuehlung* I "carry out an induction" concerning the other subject – but this only because in my self-experience which does not derive from induction, I already have a "prototype of subjectivity" (cf. Manuscript A-V-10/2, p. 175). Concerning the relative function of the "inductive method" in the *Fremderfahrung*, see Toulemont, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-71.

46. Cf. Manuscript A-V-10, pp. 121 and 122. This manuscript is 130 pages long, and was written between 1920 and 1931.

47. Cf. Manuscript C-16-IV, p. 30. This manuscript was written in March 1932 and is 32 pages long.

48. Cf. Manuscript A-V-6, p. 18. This manuscript is 44 pages long and written in 1932.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

give me away."⁵⁰ With all these modalities, we cannot yet properly speak of any "intentional unification: or of any actual I-thou connection (*Ich-Du-Konnex*): "What is still missing is the project and the will of making known – the specific activity of communication . . ."⁵¹

The behavior of the other is a manifestation (*Bekundung*) even "without the other having a specifically manifest intention, i.e., communicative." A manifestation is comprehensible simply through its being expressed. *Communication* (*Mitteilung*), in its original meaning, is something else: here I am intentionally directed towards the other and the other must be thought of as comprehending me in this intention. In communication what is requested is the manifestation of the very communicating intention. Self-expression – which generally inheres in all modes of the *Einfuehlung* – to the extent that it is intentionally communicating manifestation, is speech (*Rede*).⁵²

Here we use *speech* in its broadest sense, including communicative modalities of the spoken word, the written word, and the very gesture which explicitly communicates.⁵³ It has a particular character of immediacy: in talking, I turn directly to the one that listens and consider him solely as a listener. I do not have present the means through which my speech becomes accessible to him. The same is true for me as a speaker: if I speak, I am not aware of my voice, its volume, etc.⁵⁴ Speech is purely a turning-discursively-towards-someone (*Anrede*) in order to be included in his intention of speaking-to: its end is to have the other to whom I turn recognize that he is being recognized by me. Discursive recognition further defines the idea of community (*Gemeinschaft*), which has already emerged in the interpretation of the perceptual experience of the other: "Any sociality has as its basis (above all in the originality of the social activity actually produced) the actual connection of the communicating community, of the pure community of the turning-discursively-towards and of its assumption; more clearly: of the saying-to and paying-attention-to. This linguistic relation is the fundamental form of the communicating unification in general, the original form of a particular identification between me and the other. This results in a unification of speech between anyone and someone else who is for him the other."⁵⁵ He to whom I speak and who listens to me, who pays attention to my

50. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 32. These problems are already dealt with in *Ideen II*, *op.cit.*, p. 192 f., where the reciprocal interpersonal influence is discussed. Here Husserl indicates as *Einwirkung* (distinguishing this concept from *Wirkung*) the directing towards the other with the intention of realizing in him a modification. A fundamental form of the *Einwirkung* is discursive communication. This aspect of Manuscript A-V-6 is dealt with in more detail by Toulemont, *op.cit.*, pp. 102-109.

52. Cf. Manuscript A-V-6, p. 33.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 35. For an example of a purely gestual speech, see Manuscript A-V-23, p. 2, cited by Toulemont, *op.cit.*, p. 109.

54. A brief analysis of the immediacy of communication is contained in Manuscript A-II-1, p. 5. This manuscript was written in 1933 and is 28 pages long.

55. Cf. Manuscript A-V-6, p. 36.

speech and responds to it, is no longer merely the *other* but my *you*, and in speech we both refer to ourselves as *us*: "In speaking-to and in the assumption of this speaking, I and the other I come to a first unification. I am not only for myself, and the other is not in front of me as other, but the other is my you, and, in speaking, in listening, in answering, we already form an *us*, which is in a particular way unified and shared."⁵⁶ Here we are only at the beginning of a vast theme which has its center in the original intersubjective sharing. In order to further clarify in its proper meaning, it is necessary to describe extraneous presence in the still unmentioned perspective of the problem of time.⁵⁷

Let us go back to the beginning of our discourse, even before we directly thematized subjective otherness. There we found the problem of the explication of the meaning of the subjective pole of the intentional relation: let us attempt to penetrate the structure of subjectivity considered as such and in general. By "subjectivity" we don't mean any metaphysical "entity" which we eventually come to in virtue of some special faculty of the "spirit". Our problem is simply to ascertain, by remaining firm within phenomenological empiricism, which contents are concealed within my constant knowing myself as an *I* such as I am. At the beginning this property through which I name myself, is systematically put aside and neutralized: proceeding in this fashion I can thematically turn not upon myself, but upon subjectivity as such, while constantly remaining within self-reflection — itself understood as indifferent with respect to its contents. Husserl attempts to work out such an analysis specifically in the manuscripts C, which go under the meaningful title of "Constitution of Time as Formal Constitution" (*Zeitkonstitution als formale Konstitution*). The pure explication of the subjective structure directly concerns the constitution of time as such. Subjectivity and temporality are rooted in a single theme and cannot be considered in an abstract separation. We do not intend to deal with this, and we simply refer to Gerd Brand's exposition of this group of manuscripts dealing specifically with this theme.⁵⁸ Rather, we want to

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

56. Husserl's earliest investigations explicitly aimed at the phenomenological clarification of "internal time-consciousness" go back to the 1904-1905 period: the relevant manuscripts were edited only in 1928 by Heidegger (cf. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, trans. by James S. Churchill, Bloomington, Ind., 1964). In the better known published works the theme of time, although always present, is never in the foreground and it is usually dealt with in an obscure way: it seems as if Husserl hesitated to present publically his investigations concerning a theme which he always considered exceptionally difficult (e.g., see how he talks about it in *Ideen I*, *op. cit.*, p. 197). Enzo Paci, in his original re-elaboration of Husserl's thought, has brought to light the fundamental importance of the inextricable nexus between intentionality and time. Only upon this basis is it possible, on an interpretative level, to obtain a comprehensive and unitary vision of Husserl's thought, as it appears both in published as well as unpublished works, eliminating recurring equivocations transmitted from book to book. Cf. Paci, *op. cit.*, specifically the essay on "Tempo e Intersoggettività", pp. 129-165.

58. Gerd Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit* (The Hague, 1955).

underline an aspect, already present in Brand, which deals with our specific task. To claim that subjectivity is temporal also means to emphasize the "dialectic" through which it is constituted. Subjective identity is to be understood as a constant recapturing of a distance which is not resolved but shared, hence as a temporal process of *identification* (*Deckung*). The ego is temporal in distancing itself from itself and constantly finds itself in a community (*Gemeinschaft*) with itself. Had such not been the case, a past and a future would have no meaning for the I⁵⁹ and an I which has neither a past nor future is not even an I. The assertion of the self-reflective ungraspability of the I, which has given rise to many metaphysical extravagances, makes sense only if it is meant to indicate the temporality of subjectivity as such. If I describe the I as it is purely given in self-reflection, I am always referred back to a new operating of the I and this reveals as a subject to me my mode of being in time and of having time: "Therefore I am present to myself in the original form of the 'now' without being objective, not in so far as I know myself and I am knowable, but altogether and immediately. But to the extent that I am completely and immediately present to myself, I can also be present to myself objectively, not as I am in my operating, but as I was 'shortly before'."⁶⁰ In reflecting, the object-I is distinct and far from the I which now reflects, but it is the I which I was 'shortly before'. There is always a distance in the I, but this distance "is always already filled, because I am always the same." Reflection is the difference and the coincidence of the I, the filled distance, the original explication of a "now" and of a "shortly before".⁶¹ The I's identity, which is revealed in the possibility of reflection and in the constant identification in the distance of a past and of a future is designated by Husserl as a *living fluent present*.⁶²

All of this remains valid if I explicitly consider the presence to me of the other and reflect within my reduced propriety: I am exactly that which I am in the continual recapturing of the distance between the I of my present and the I's of my past and of my possible future. In this present I presentify the I that I have been and that I can be in the future. My own subjective identity is constantly reconstituted in the presentifying operations. The synthesis of identification which leads back to my self is possible to the extent that the numerous acts of numerous I's are coexisting in the form of time. This is not the time "of everyone" (a meaning which remains yet to be constituted) nor subjective time "in general". My own time (*Selbstzeit*) is the time in which I myself am and in which the numerous egological acts are *mine*.⁶³ Egological immanence has meaning only if it is temporal, and therefore only if it is shared: if it contains a distance which persists in the identification. In this distance, internal to egological life itself and not identifiable with exact coincidence, *otherness* already has a model of itself. The I presupposes the other — and the

59. Cf. Manuscript C-16-III, p. 13. This manuscript is 15 pages long and was written in May 1932.

60. Brand, *op.cit.*, p. 131.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

63. For an elaboration of the notion of *Selbstzeit*, see Manuscript C-16-VI, p. 36. This manuscript is 39 pages long, and was written in May 1932.

presupposition is not an argumentative reason, but simply its being posed before the I to itself. The presupposed otherness is the other which I have been once, which I can be in the future, or which I project of being within my possibilities or in the impossibility of my fantasy: "What I intuitively experience as subjectively alien is, according to its entire intuitive content – according to the entire intuitive structure of meaning, by abstracting from the mode of being of what is subjectively alien – necessarily inherent in the domain of my possible pure self-experience, to the extent that it is already outlined from the domain of its own possible fantasy."⁶⁴ At any rate, the other is not a link in a deductive chain: he is always and only given in a specific form of *experience* which we have agreed to indicate by the term *Einfuehlung*. In fact, within my primordial field there appears primordiality which is not mine and which cannot be brought to an immediate synthetic unity with it. The other is experienced as *itself* primordial and constituting on the basis of the original centrality of his present – his own time: "Every I which I experience as other in original presentification has *its* unity, its flowing life, its immanent temporal flux of concrete temporalization and its primordial nature."⁶⁵ There is no other unity between me and the other, through which the *alter ego* can be recognized by me as the other I which I have once been. The other is there in his own transcendence: "No continuity leads from my egological pole, i.e., from my continuous substratum of inactive intentionality and from my acts (whose external continuity, in the temporal flux, has as a correlate the opposite continuity of the I-pole which is in a shared identity with itself) towards the other egological pole."⁶⁶

In my temporal immanence, *I render present* another temporal immanence. In my present, I presentify another present: *Einfuehlung* itself is nothing but an altogether particular mode of *presentification*.⁶⁷ It is necessary to pause on this point. In the *Einfuehlung* my acts intentionally and appresentatively imply extraneous acts and the other's presentations in appresentative mediation,⁶⁸ along with his appresentation and his presentification through which he temporally constitutes himself in his egological immanence and recognizes in me another egological immanence. My rendering present is therefore directed towards another rendering present: towards what is already presentifying by itself. In *Einfuehlung* I come to the I, but not to the same I which I am. Here the I is actually *another*, in front of my I "in an externally present temporal field".⁶⁹ "If we remain in the original perception of the other man in which his I is presentified and appresented, even if in a limiting modality, and if we continually remain in the co-validity through which the very 'we' of the other is

64. Manuscript A-VI-20, p. 45. Cf. Manuscript C-17-I, pp. 6-7.

65. Manuscript C-16-VII, p. 4.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

67. In the fifth of the *Cartesian Meditations*, the temporal theme is not pursued. For an emphasis on the *Einfuehlung* as a form of presentification, see *Cartesian Meditations, op.cit.*, pp. 144-145. For an emphasis on the intersubjective constitution of time, see *ibid.*, p. 156.

68. Cf. Manuscript C-16-VII, p. 13.

69. Manuscript C-16-VI, p. 30.

given in continuity not only the 'we' of the material body but of the man, then I myself am near him but only I myself as he who fulfills the apperception of man, and the interfelt components included in it: 'near him' means nothing more than being near him in the presentification for the *Einfuehlung*.⁷⁰

In the encounter, two spheres of immanence reciprocally face each other. The primordial I centered in its immanent temporality, and the other I, constituted appresentatively for himself: a primordial I constituting himself in his own time. The most radical and profound distance between the I and the other seems to consist of this being centered in a temporal and reciprocally extraneous property. Yet, in general, the presentifying operation does not just fix a mere distance but necessarily carries out an identifying function: *the presentification always carries out a transcending of the transcendence*. That is clear if we limit ourselves to considering the recollection in which a past is distanced as past and recognized as present. But the *Einfuehlung* – although there is some kind of an analogy – is not a recollection:⁷¹ then what is the character of its peculiar being a presentification in relation to its own reciprocal transcendence of time, and how can an identification take place? The answer to such a question must lead to the constitution of temporal objectivity in which we all already know ourselves to be.

The primordially reduced living present is the now (*Jetzt*) in which I know myself as a corporeal subject: it is my now as the further and essential determination of my here. I am an I *here* and *now*, and I am properly an I only in this form of spatio-temporal individuation. The phenomenological path which leads to the themes of egological concreteness necessarily goes through the clarification of the experience of subjective otherness in its proper modality and in the sense of its constitutive operating. If we limit ourselves to time, we are led to specify fluid living present in the living temporality of my *now* in front of the living now of the other. By estranging the other's now, the present individuates itself as mine in the encounter. The community which leads reciprocal estrangement to identification is revealed in this individuating correlativity. I constitute the other in his now during my now, but the *same now* joins us both. We are not in the sameness of a time which transcends and contains us: the foundation of the temporal community is my very present within which *another* same present is revealed and discovered as the same: the community is the synthetic formation of temporal distance. By becoming specific and individuated as *mine*, this now is distinguished and shared. This is where the togetherness of mine and of the other's now comes into being as *temporal contemporaneity (zeitliches Zugleich)*.⁷² Recollection also includes a simultaneity of the presentified present which has past and which is *now* remembered as a past *now*, but this being together of two *nows* is not a temporal contemporaneity: it is not a new now, i.e., a new temporal determination. Contemporaneity properly understood is the simultaneity of two (or more) *nows* in the synthesis of a new now: "While I fulfill my *Einfuehlung* in my living present, I have my present and

70. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 35. Also cf. Manuscript C-16-VII, p. 15.

72. Cf. Manuscript C-17-I, p. 14. This manuscript is 44 pages long, and was written in September 1931.

that of the other in their extending themselves in a punctual contemporaneity. The difference, however, is that the present of the other is not given to me as perceptively intuitive, but is intra-felt. What is given in the *Einfuehlung* (the presentified) is what is continuously experienced and continuously unified with the experienced. But one could say: this is also what happens with intuitive recollection. In relation to reciprocal duration, the present recollecting is specifically identified with what is recalled. But this contemporaneity of identification is not temporal contemporaneity: the first is my present while the second is my past."⁷³

The synthesis of recollection is *egological* through time: it is not a synthesis of time. On the other hand, the presentification through the *Einfuehlung* is an identification of time which implies the synthetic formation of an *egological* pole of a higher kind. To the extent that it is first of all an original identification of time, the *egological* synthesis produced in the encounter differs in its meaning from the *egological* synthesis carried out in recollection. The truth is that the necessary connection obtaining between temporality and ego-ness in general is no less revealed in the case of recollection than in that of the presentification through the *Einfuehlung*: but here the *egological* pole of the synthesis is not the I itself, but the intersubjective temporal unity of the *we*.

The *Einfuehlung* establishes a distance in the present between me and the other I, along with a shared present in contemporaneity. Furthermore, the other is known as having his own past and his own future. If, on the one hand, I rediscover myself as present in the continuous retention of the I just passed to which, by operating, I become united with, and I discover myself as the past by turning back to the I which I once was, the other also becomes known as contemporary with his past and his future, not in the mode of mere distance, but of *shared* distance. Contemporaneity is the fundamental form of any intersubjective temporal synthesis. Yet, it presupposes further shared dimensions – at least in the sense of possible sharing. The extraneous past may no longer be accessible to me and it could remain totally unknown: in principle, however, it can be rediscovered and identified: "In this respect, we must reflect on the fact that, while I fulfill a radically intuitive *Einfuehlung*, I can identify my living present and my bygone past which, with that of the other, can be reawakened through recollection. Furthermore, if the other remembers a preceding past in which he was not the object of my *Einfuehlung*, this remembered past can then become accessible to me. To the extent that a section of his and my time can be identified, temporal togetherness can also be identified."⁷⁴

My other, with which I am in a temporally shared dual identification, is not accessible to me only in what he himself is now, has been or wants to be. Since he is my "intentional repetition", he in turn has others which are directly appresented to him. The unity of temporal and *egological* identification is repeatable to infinity. I learn of others through my other. He is for me, as I am for him, a center of infinite mediations. The contemporaneous present which we

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

have initially constituted as identification between me and my other, is extended to include a shared totality of presents in their original modality.⁷⁵ Since such an identification implies temporal togetherness, we find at the transcendental foundation of "objective" time and "objective" humanity, the infinitely open present of the intersubjective totality. The constitution of time cannot be separated from the constitution of subjective otherness, and the intersubjective sharedness of the encounter is always also temporal sharedness.

To understand the meaning of the dialectic between distance and sharedness, between the identified and the separated, is to clarify the reasons for Husserl's orientation towards a monadologic perspective. The single monad's own time (*Selbstzeit*) is the *form of existence* (*Existenzform*) of its subjective life: for it (time) the "monads" are what they are, have a style, and are centered in their own egological immanence.⁷⁶ Their transcendental times are the "forms of their self-enclosed individuality."⁷⁷ They are separated, not only as mere bodies, but also as "souls."⁷⁸ The separation of the monad is its factual absoluteness, the irrepeatability of its time, and its being once and for all. The intersubjective temporal synthesis is not a real extension of my living time, as if I were to take possession of the infinite repetition. The individual, as the center of repetitive temporal mediation, is *once and for all*: "Animated individuals, not only in terms of their own bodies, but already in themselves, are 'separated' individuals – yet, this word is not suited, although the souls are indivisible and even in this precise sense of the term they are individuals. What comes under scrutiny here is the other meaning of once-for-all of being which the souls retain not only to the extent that they are circumstantiated in an already given universal time, but because they are by themselves, by their own temporal being, intentionally including the other temporality which is essentially other."⁷⁹ Separation (*Trennung*) is therefore insurmountable: "On the other hand, this separation does not prevent, rather, it is the condition which makes possible the monads' 'identification', i.e., so that they can participate in a community. Yet, what this means is that they co-exist. Moreover: they are monads co-existing in the plural, as another monad's possibility of being."⁸⁰ In its effective actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) every monad implies the possibility of being of the other monad. But the community's actuality is the community itself constituted in the presentification through the *Einfuehlung*, between me and my you, the community of *existence* with *existence*, and in the originally intersubjective temporal form: temporal contemporaneity. In the intersubjective encounter, the identification concerns the integrity of the subject's life: not the mere temporality, but "filled time."⁸¹ Furthermore, the validity produced in the identification concerns being itself.

75. All the primordial presents are joined in an intersubjective present. Cf. Manuscript A-V-5, p. 82.

76. For time as *Existenzform*, see Manuscript C-17-I, p. 4.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

78. The term "soul", which will be used again, should not worry the reader; it only indicates the animation of the material body.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.*

81. For an elaboration of the notion of *erfuellte Zeit*, see *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

Co-existence (*Koexistenz*) is the fullness of the intersubjective temporal form which is realized in the distance temporally shared by living existences, in themselves primordial and centered in their own proper living time. Thus, it is not "an empty being together, but for me a being-there-for-me, a being 'common' to me; in such a way that my being, by presentifying another, experiences and at the same time can experience that it experiences itself as presentifying."⁸²

Let us deal with this differently. Man in the world (*mundaner Mensch*) has, to the extent that he is a material body, a spatial extension and an objective duration. Considered as bodies, men interact in a relation of reciprocal exteriority (*Aussereinander*). But man's being in the world and in time is not resolved in this objectification: the "monad" does not have a time outside itself, nor does it refer to other monads in an already constituted objectivity of the time in which the material bodies are reciprocally ordered. The monad is itself already a self-contained "world". It is the transcendental foundation of every temporal constitution: "the 'world' of the individual monad has its own world as a form of co-existence of its 'realities', i.e., the time of being and the time of the soul's life. All of its life, all of its acts, its association, its persistence of adaptability once established, of habits, etc., flow in this time. Here everything has 'its own time', i.e., its own duration, its beginning and its end within total time, which is the very monad, the very concrete soul, to the extent that it is filled with contents in a necessary continuity, assumed precisely in itself and for itself, once its material body has been abstracted."⁸³

My time is always individuated and distinct from the time of the other: it is necessarily separated like the spatial localization of my body and that of someone else. But does temporal separation follow, through some kind of parallelism, from material separation? "Could the souls be contemporaneous and situated one after the other, temporally coexisting, only through the tie with material bodies, therefore through *methexis*, with universal natural time?"⁸⁴

The material body is in spatial time (*Raumzeit*): in the objective temporal totality of nature. Its real being is determined by the participation in this totality. Its concreteness is always relative because it is mediated from "circumstances" and determined within the natural-causal nexus.⁸⁵ Certainly, the soul participates in the spatial temporality of bodies because it is always necessarily "embodied". But if we consider man in his specific subjective being, we must emphasize that bodily co-existence "presupposes" a purely internal co-existence: a "nexus of souls" (*seelischer Zusammenhang*).⁸⁶ The subject's concrete absoluteness – its being in itself and for itself – is not and cannot be mere separation. If we pose this problem in traditional terms, we could ask: what defines the soul's "substantiality"? "The answer, evidently, must be something like: souls are not only in and for themselves, they are human I-subjects in the concretion of their fluid life considered as purely psychic. But,

82. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

as such, in their monadic temporality, they are not being in and for themselves. They are also and essentially in actual and potential community, in actual and potential connections, in which the *commercium* the 'frequenting' in its multiple forms is only a particularity."⁸⁷

The relation between monads is such that *they* penetrate each other (*sie gehen einander an*): "souls are not only for themselves, but they *penetrate* each other."⁸⁸ This means: the subject is such and it is concrete only because of this relational structure. Because of it the I has a style, a life and a body. The *Einfuehlung*, the comprehensive encounter of the other, is the original mode of penetration.⁸⁹ Another I is given to me, *it is (ist da)* in my present as other and it "penetrates" me. Through the *Einfuehlung* "I refer to a second I and to his life. Through it he *is* for me immediately as other and he penetrates *me*; to the extent that he is another, he already *penetrates me* due to the fact that before any interaction with him, *eo ipso* I not only experience his life, as soon as it actually comes into being for me (and it thus offers itself in the always determined sphere of intuitive possibilities), but I co-live, co-perceive, co-believe, co-judge, co-agree in refuting, doubting, congratulating, fearing together, etc."⁹⁰ At this point we can conclude our preliminary attempt to define the meaning of Husserl's constitutive theory of subjective otherness and we are now started on a direct consideration of the themes inherent and deriving from the verification of the "original sharing" (*Urvergemeinschaftung*) of life and existence of the I and of his other.

III.

"At the end it will appear clearly
— I think — that the 'ahistorical
Husserl' only temporarily distanced
himself from history (which in reality
had always been present to him), pre-
cisely in order to deepen the method to
the point of being able to ask scientific
questions about it." — Husserl⁹¹

In posing the theme of subjective otherness, phenomenology comes to the very ground of the I's *self-being*. By itself this is not at all surprising: the initial phenomenological operation started out from my concrete existence. Who can start me on the path of a radical conscious questioning (*presa di coscienza*) other than *myself*, who decides to undertake a philosophical reflection in the midst of the crisis of the obvious and already given truth, of the very undisputed truth

87. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

88. *Ibid.* Here Husserl's *angehen* is rendered as *to penetrate*.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

90. *Ibid.*

91. From a letter of Husserl to G. Misch dated Freiburg, November 27, 1930. Quoted from A. Diemer, *Edmund Husserl, Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phaenomenologie* (Meisenheim a.G., 1956), p. 394.

and reality of both my and of the world's being? It is precisely I myself who already knows of having a name and a body, of having been born once, and of having a "life" and a "history" of my own. Scepticism is this re-questioning of the concrete and already known truth of my being: the sceptical shadow annihilates the already known into the unknown, the already true into the possibility of falsity. The sceptical crisis discloses the field of philosophical reflection: it refuses to accept what has already been accepted, and to believe what has already been believed simply because it has been accepted and it has been believed. It wants *to see*. In the decision we have lost our knowing for ourselves to be already in the world and reality in its transparent and enigmatic being there in front of us along with our very name, birth, and possible death. If we do not want to renounce the responsibility of truth, to the point of accepting the obvious daily knowing-already in its undisputed indisputability, we must go to the foundation: through and beyond scepticism. In the dehistoricization and in the disindividuation of the philosophical decision, we come to the *ego* which, to the extent that it is deprived of every concreteness, is not properly an I. Rather, it is an egological form or an invariant structure: not a subject, but "egoness".⁹² The analysis directed at ascertaining the formal character of the ego leads to the clarification of essential connections which bind subject and time. Egological identity (*ipseita*) has no meaning unless it is temporal flowing, and continually re-established self-identity. If it is assumed as atemporal identity, it becomes annihilated as egoness. Its being is not only a flowing or a fluid life, but a temporal self-sharing. It is a self-distancing: a self-projecting towards a future I. The ego's temporal immanence necessarily and constantly transcends itself. In becoming temporalized, the ego-ness which hitherto could not be defined as either one or many "becomes individuated" by specifying itself as an identity which "changes" and as a unity which "renders itself" many. "By departing from myself and by penetrating the transcendental, the question of the infinity of the transcendental multiplicity of subjects becomes disclosed, along with the question of the infinity of temporalization."⁹³ This "process" begins and ends within the egological form. Thus, it should not be idealistically mistaken for a real production.

The egoness considered here is the initial solipsistic ego. As long as I remain at this level I am a prisoner of the form and I cannot discover myself as I really am: an embodied subject and a man in the world. This is precisely the problem: the *fact* that I am a subject in the already given world, among subjects intentionally referred to me and to the world, and present with me in it.⁹⁴ The study of the experience of the other leads to this in order to discover how it is that *someone else* has meaning: I must comprehend what I really am and what the other really is. Thus, we find ourselves considering the dimension of how to fill the form, not egoness in general and its temporality, but the very embodied ego in its own living time and in his relation of real and factual co-existence with the other. Are we thus forced to verify the passage of phenomenology to

92. For a discussion of *invariante Struktur*, see Manuscript C-II-I, p. 3. This manuscript is 28 pages long and was probably written in 1923.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

“existentialism”? We will deal with this question only to the extent that it will free our discourse from possible equivocation.

It is not easy to untie the crucial knot that ambiguously joins phenomenology and existentialism. Concerning this problem, today there are many current opinions and some unsure attempts, but it does not seem to us that there is any even approximately adequate answer. The question is first of all historical. It is a matter of fully considering what existentialism, and Heidegger in particular, has drawn from Husserlian thought and, moreover, its meaning. Furthermore, a certain problematic which comes to light from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts is suggested, at least in the titles, by a reading of *Sein und Zeit*. But no serious historiographic result will be possible in principle, unless we fully understand the different contexts within which similar themes are investigated by Husserl and Heidegger respectively.

The fact that Heidegger analyzes Being-there (*Dasein*) because this is the source of access to Being (*Sein*) is well known. Because of this, Heidegger forbids us to enter and to remain on the transcendental ground on which Husserl had arrived in undertaking the project of a rigorous foundation of knowledge. The *epoche* is limited to the criticism of the already-understood, of “obviousness”, and the reductive operation is put aside to the extent that, through it, one reaches the ground of egological formality. In this regard, Heidegger is explicitly against Husserl. Having reached the problem of the “who” of *Dasein*, this is how he describes the Husserlian path: “But is it not contrary to the rules of all sound method to approach a problematic without sticking to what is given as evident in the area of our theme? And what is more indubitable than the givenness of the ‘I’? And does not this givenness tell us that if we aim to work this out primordially, we must disregard everything else that is ‘given’ — not only a ‘world’ that is (*einer seienden ‘Welt’*), but even the Being of other ‘I’s? The kind of ‘giving’ we have here is the mere, formal, reflective awareness of the ‘I’; and perhaps what it gives is indeed evident. This insight even affords access to a phenomenological problematic in its own right, which has in principle the signification of providing a framework as a ‘formal phenomenology of consciousness’.”⁹⁵ Heidegger's criticism of this position is as follows: “Yet even the positive Interpretation of *Dasein* which we have so far given, already forbids us to start with the formal givenness of the ‘I’, if our purpose is to answer the question of the ‘who’ in a way which is phenomenally adequate. In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated ‘I’ without Others is just as far from being proximally given.”⁹⁶ Thus, Heidegger abandons the formal phenomenology of consciousness along with the transcendental discourse to which the radical questioning of the phenomenological reduction leads, and subordinates the egological component to the merely “existential”.

95. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tuebingen, 1953), p. 115; English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York and Evanston, 1961), p. 151.

96. *Ibid.*, German p. 116, English p. 152.

In Husserl the existent becomes thematized without having the coherence of the phenomenological discourse being broken or deviated. Consequently, the method of inquiry and the meaning of its results is altogether different. This is already clear from the fact that in Husserl *Dasein* has essentially the meaning of *presence*. As soon as I reduce the egological being to my own being and I become my own concrete presence to myself thus constituting upon this foundation the other as apperceptively present to me, I have thematized the existent. I recognize myself in my *Dasein* by recognizing the other and knowing myself as a perceiving agent in a present constituted in the retention of a past and in the protention of a future, as a style through time. I rediscover my existential concreteness and correlatively that of the other along with our co-existing since I apprehend myself not as a mere ego in a mere temporal form, but as myself in a filled time, in my individuated corporeality and in my *history*. If we remain within a rigorous phenomenological consideration of *Dasein*, we will be immediately forced to consider the theme of the historical-intersubjective sharing: "In an absolute consideration every ego has its own history and he exists only as the subject of a history: his own. And every communicating community of absolute ego's or of absolute subjectivities – in whose fullness of concretion inheres the constitution of the world – has its 'passive' and 'active' history, and it exists only in this history."⁹⁷

We can now try to indicate, in the light of these considerations, the fundamental direction of Husserl's investigations and the meaning of their last turning towards the theme of monadology, intersubjectivity, and history. Let us return once again to the phenomenological re-evaluation of the "much discussed but little understood" Copernican revolution, in which Husserl recognizes the "eternal meaning of Kantian philosophy."⁹⁸ The transcendental inversion denounces the obviousness of the natural attitude in posing every problem as a problem of immanent givenness. Phenomenology resumes this intention and finds it necessary to clarify the meaning of the subjective intentional pole of the phenomenological field. On this point Husserl has been misunderstood from the very beginning. Even those "who had distinguished themselves the most as excellent phenomenologists"⁹⁹ saw in the first volume of *Ideas* an inadmissible deviation in view of the problematic of *The Logical Investigations*. Against those who saw in the positing of the egological thematic the advent of some kind of idealistic metaphysics, he reiterates the unity and the coherence of his procedure and polemically restates that to separate phenomenology and "transcendental idealism" is equivalent to misunderstanding the "most profound meaning of the intentional method."¹⁰⁰ Thus, the misunderstanding was double: we became even more convinced that phenomenology was "idealism" and we misunderstood not only the "most profound meaning of the intentional method", but

97. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie II*, p. 506.

98. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie I*, p. 240.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

100. *Cartesian Meditations, op.cit.*, pp. 79-80, and *Erste Philosophie II*, p. 181, where it is claimed that phenomenology is nothing more than "the first rigorously scientific form of transcendental idealism", an assertion often repeated by Husserl.

also the meaning of the phenomenological re-evaluation of the idealistic intention. Instead, what was meaningful was not generally noticed: by developing the egological theme Husserl arrived at the position of intersubjectivity and at the correlative theme of monadological individuation. The initial critical project concludes in the recognition of monadic intersubjectivity as "primary being".¹⁰¹ Phenomenological radicalism here reaches its final leg. It is now possible to claim that no problem holds a privilege in principle so that it cannot be dealt with by the rigorous knowledge of the phenomenon. Every problem is philosophical and its positing is legitimate only if carried out within this knowledge: "Phenomenology does not claim that it stops in front of the 'great and final' problems."¹⁰² Phenomenology's anti-metaphysical attitude on the basis of which it has even been possible to smuggle antiquated philosophical systems, does not have its meaning in being in principle indifferent to "metaphysics" and in being consequently able to be filled by whatever metaphysical content. Rather, it expresses itself precisely in the fact that in principle *it does not exclude metaphysics* and it is not neutral in front of problems traditionally entrusted to mythological or pre-philosophical (religious or metaphysical) elaborations. In this respect, the viewpoint that makes of philosophy different "private opinions concerning the world" is brought to its extreme consequences of dissolution, while the "positive" and "empirical" unveiling of "reality" as the essential task of philosophical research seems to be restated.

Posing a phenomenological task is nonsense unless there is actually something. Thus we can state a basic principle which up until now has remained implicit. The foundation of the possibility of phenomenology is the *Faktum*. First of all, and this is why we are faced with a statement both rigorously realistic as well as rigorously idealistic, there is the fact that I am: my apodictic factuality. "I am? Certainly, I am! And I say: 'I am' apodictically so. I am as the ego of my now flowing life, as the ego which constantly experiences the world which is and which carries out the identification, and can constantly recognize the world in this identification."¹⁰³ My "I am" is not subject to doubt: "I am" and I reflexively know this "in thinking, I think of myself as the experienced in self-experience, as the experienced having a life, a consciousness, faculties, etc. In thinking I determine myself as the experienced itself: I recognize myself as an apodictic being."¹⁰⁴ Reflective thought does not produce my being and it adds nothing to it because being does not follow from thinking: it is only its intentional correlate.¹⁰⁵ Reflection reveals the transcendental of my factual being. I am the fact that I am. But it implies "monadic subjectivity", the others' subjectivities, and their historicity which has constituted me in my own historical factuality. I can say that my very historicity embraces within the mode of reality and of possibility all the relative monadic historicities.¹⁰⁶ Further-

101. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 156.

102. *Ibid.*

103. Manuscript A-VI-23, p. 9. For an elaboration of "mein apodiktisches Faktum", see Manuscript A-VII-11, p. 16.

104. Manuscript A-VI-23, p. 10.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

106. Cf. Manuscript A-VII-11, p. 16.

more, in my *Faktum* I am the ultimate I. I am in temporal atemporality of the living present and "I carry within me the monadic totality, history, and the historical constitution of the world as the 'transcendental totality of the world' (monadic totality)." ¹⁰⁷ As Husserl put it, "the concrete and individuated I is the *Weltall*. This revelation is categorically absurd. Similarly, it would be absurd to speak of the individuated I, or of the transcendental Husserlian subject, as of the absolute. But the revelation, absurd on the categorical level, is not so in the pre-categorical level. Here subjectivity in the first person, to the extent that it is my own, is the subjectivity in which all the ego's in the first person are revealed to themselves as universally their own. I don't 'live' this universality as the universality of everyone else, yet, it is the universality of all the first persons *like myself*." ¹⁰⁸

Factuality means pre-giveness and, as an ego of the living present, I am given first, and I am in the pre-giveness of the world. My reflective aposteriority, in which I claim that "I am" is the indication of the apriority of my factual pre-giveness. ¹⁰⁹ What is a priori is I in my *Faktum* and in the connections which are revealed to denaturalized reflection: a priori it is the very pre-giveness in the style of its historical being: "... I see that in pre-giveness I have the world, that I myself could know and I do know, that I have already discovered this historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*), that I have already become an autonomous man and that I have carried this autonomy to a free and actual realization by obtaining in it an a priori knowledge. With that I have already obtained in my own pre-giveness and from my reshaping of it, a form for historicity (*Historizitaet*) of pre-giveness, itself inherent in my own pre-giveness, which is historical (*historisch*) and inclusive of its own historicity (*Historizitaet*) as pre-giveness." ¹¹⁰

If we say that the I-man, in his monadic and factual concreteness, is the objective formation of transcendental subjectivity, we do not thereby mean to reintroduce an "idealistic" perspective according to which a hypostasized and reified objectivity generates the embodied and individuated ego in a real dialectical process. Rather, we wish to emphasize the *possibility*, immanent in its very being factual of this factual ego as an "object in the world", of transcending this objectivity.

"Consciousness" is always naturalized in a body and in a natural environment. Yet, it is never mere nature. Through his body, which is the indication of his participation in inert materiality and the condition of his factual being, the human-ego lives *in the world* by exercising a *praxis* upon it. His temporal being is not a mere upholding — time does not pass by above him — nor is it a mere succession of himself to himself. Man is not a thing (a *res*) but active intentionality and total *praxis* through which is expressed the transcendental

107. Manuscript A-VII-11, p. 17. This manuscript was written in 1925 and 1932, and is 133 pages long.

108. Cf. Enzo Paci, "Nuove Ricerche Fenomenologiche", in *Aut Aut*, n. 68, March 1962, p. 105.

109. Cf. Manuscript A-VII-11, p. 18.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 19. Husserl does not clearly differentiate between *Geschichtlichkeit* and *Historizitaet*.

of his factual being defining this being as properly *historical*.

Man is in the world as operating upon the things of the world through labor, modification, invention, and in the very self-expression which is originally a mode of subjective *praxis*. Temporality has its content in this life activity through which man realizes himself as man in time by "humanizing" the world: "Humanization is the constant process of being human, self-humanization, being in a constant genesis of self-formation and humanization of the world."¹¹¹

To the extent that he is individuated *in* and *through* sharing, man finds himself in his being, in a concrete temporal process already started and proceeding. *I am in history*: I am in an already humanized world which expresses its preceding genesis.¹¹² I can go back in time, I can know of the coming of man into the world first and foremost as an animal species among other species, of his savage life, of his "struggle for existence",¹¹³ and of his gradual adaptation to natural conditions. In a symbiosis with nature, man becomes human and he humanizes nature: this becomes "culture" and "nature spiritualized by reason" which becomes historicized in the history of man.¹¹⁴

My being in history is this participation to total historicity which is primarily human, but *ipso facto* also of nature. Nature is historical by departing from me, from my historicity, even in the ages that have preceded man's *coming into the world*. The natural becoming I come to know through the sciences of the history of nature is a becoming which I place in time. I comprehend it in its evolving until something like the animal "homo" has been generated and he has initiated his own "history" and, finally, by indicating in the events that have preceded him "what was before him": the pre-human and the "non-spiritual". In Husserl, the "historical" has this total meaning: it grasps man's being in the world starting from the original natural-material matrix, up to the highest spiritual and natural formations.

History and nature refer to a total transcendental history: mundane historicity, writes Husserl, is the formation of transcendental historicity.¹¹⁵ That does not mean that historical factuality was permeated by a transcendental meaning, but that in it remains hidden a meaning of absolute foundation. "Human nature and history become transcendental indications of the unity of a transcendental history, in which transcendental subjectivity is essentially, in every transcendental genesis, became-becoming *in infinitum* and has, in this became-becoming, its constant being. Its being is historical. Its infinity is historical infinity which is concealed to the point of complete incomprehensibility in the spatio-temporal infinity of nature. It raises to a relative comprehensibility in human history, even if all remains transcendently concealed: but in its being concealed, it becomes comprehensible to the phenomenologist."¹¹⁶

111. Manuscript A-V-10, p. 25.

112. *Ibid.*

113. Cf. Manuscript C-I, p. 1. This manuscript is 6 pages long, and was written in 1934.

114. *Ibid.*

115. Cf. Manuscript A-VII-11, p. 22.

116. Manuscript A-V-10, p. 27.

From naive "realism", through sceptic and solipsistic "idealism", we have come to a rigorous thematization of being itself, and having excluded the "existentialist" solution, we have begun to comprehend this being as essentially "historical". The term "historicity", however, still remains necessarily empty of meaningful content. In order to attempt a rough definition of it, rather than accepting the allusive suggestions that the term entails in its ordinary usage, we must thematically recapture that dimension of "property" in the sense of operating living corporeality. Of this, we already possess an initial and essential element in the definition of egological being. Thus, we go back to what seems to be most distant from the ordinary meanings of "historical": the original level of egological life and primordially as a system of perception and instinct. We come to this terrain by operating a kind of abstraction through which I subtract from the I that I am now, in the fullness of my faculties, all that belongs to me as a reflecting and consciously projecting "personal" I. In a way, "I impoverish" my whole cluster of attributes which define me as a man among other men. This abstractive operation must now be reinterpreted as temporal reflection.

Earlier, we asserted the essential temporality of the ego considered as such. In its reflective turning towards itself, the ego finds its now within a past and future horizon: it experiences its becoming in a *genesis*. Let us consider more closely the mode of this genetic self-constitution: it is not a matter of a simple line which goes from the past, to the present, on to the future. Actually, the location of this constitution is always the present of the ego. The past, periodically thematized through recollection, is the present already gone by, now apprehended in this present. But it is now in an immobile fixity. It constantly flows with the living-present flowing of the I. Actually, the past presents itself from time to time provided with an increase of meaning which it derives from the successive living and expressing of the ego. The egological progressing towards the future increases the reflective regression of the ego upon its own past. The concreting upon itself of this past is correlative with the progressive genesis of my present emerging from the genesis sedimented in my past. This, however, is true only in a relative sense. To the potentialization of the past deriving from life towards the future is also connected its continuous and progressive depotentialization. If the I considered purely in its egological being is in a *genesis*, by reflectively returning to it, in the constant self-impoverishment (*Verarmung*), it comes to a limit: *the egological birth*.

How can we think of this ego in its initial limit? It does not have any experience in the proper sense. Its experiencing does not have any past experiencing. Its sphere of proximity is not yet a "world". It is a *wretched I* (*armselig Ich*): pure corporeal apprehension of what is immediately around it, while any mediation is excluded in principle. The wretched I is to be defined as mere perceptive corporeality. It does not perceive "objects" but simply "perceptions". The *wretched I* is perceptivity and corporeality: yet it is already an I. In the perceiving self-reference, the body is in fact already egologically formed: "This sphere of proximity still has the living body as its *nucleus* in its being referred to itself. As an I, it has the wretched I which, in its state of poverty, disposes only in the body, with the faculties which are its own."¹¹⁷

117. Manuscript C-8-I, p. 2. This manuscript is 24 pages long, and was written

Thus, we ask: If the *ego* finds as its limit the living body as already given, aren't we faced with the problem of its own genesis? The corporeal and perceiving *wretched I* is the limiting I, but it itself departs from a *genesis*. The beginning cannot be a sudden coming to light of the I, but a being in the beginning: a beginning and an already began. It is not a matter of an *I which is wide awake*, but of an *I which awakens*: "Since the genesis is essentially under way as soon as the I is *awakened*, in the same way that I have a perceptive field (even if it is not yet a field of things), we have as a limit *the awakening I* which becomes I-man, growing to a 'life' and constituting itself always more consciously for itself."¹¹⁸ Then, the *corporeal birth* of the very I comes into question.

An analogous reduction to mere corporeality, which contains an even more profound set of problems, concerns the possible ending of the I. While before we have been concerned with seeing the past from the present, in this case we must deal with the modality of the present which discloses the future: not of recollection, but of the I as a projecting being in the present. The future is for the I its *possibility* and the I of the present which opens *itself towards the future* is the *I can*: its originally corporeal practicality.¹¹⁹ The body *can* when it is in a "normal" state, but in sickness or in misfortune, it experiences its eventual failure. The constant and progressive degeneration of my body starting from a crucial moment (maturity) is certainly conceivable. My body's degeneration is also the depotentialization of the future. The horizon of the possible and of my practical present within which I always live becomes limited. This restriction obtains not just towards the future, but also towards the past: "Undoubtedly, a certain genesis takes place all the time because the I is always presented with a new apperceived mundane. But with his strength decreasing, the surrounding world becomes restricted along with the present, since the sphere of attainability shrinks (the relative 'distances' become increasingly longer), the sphere of operative formations which could be projected and executed diminishes, and therefore the possible future becomes restricted and decreases. But the same thing happens with the past because of the decrease of the strength of memory, as the strength of the availability of the past."¹²⁰

How is the limit of this process, i.e., the *end* possible? Can it be imagined as a "dreamless sleep" or as a being completely deprived of any mundane possibility? But how can we experience this end which provisionally appears as a "dreamless sleep"? And if this analogy makes sense, can we "awaken" from it? Only the gradual self-destruction of the body can be experienced: not its total destruction. The progressive decrease of our experiencing only foretells us about not being able of experiencing any more.¹²¹ Having reached a limit, the ego can no longer dispose of a body, and, through it, of a world: "But how can we think of this? Is this ego, then, still the ego of the beginning? But then it should be an 'ego which awakens' affected by distinct sense data. Or else it is not yet an awakened ego, as the ego of the beginning before the beginning (if this makes

October 1929.

118. *Ibid.*

119. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

any sense), still without distinctions: a being and a living in itself completely undifferentiated. But here we ask: does this make sense or doesn't it inhere to the essence of the I, the being-potentiated-toward-something, either this or that, to the different, and is not the I a polarization of living which presupposes counter poles in a constitutive process of objective formation?"¹²² The phenomenological problem of death questions the very intentional structure of consciousness. Yet, it must be brought down to it, if it is to be considered as an authentic philosophical problem. The difficulties which arise at this point and the prudence required in dealing with them, explain the sudden stop in the manuscript cited so far. As soon as he poses the above question, Husserl observes that all that has been said has meaning only starting from the "mundane and concretely developed living", and that the inferences which can be drawn are to be understood within a certain abstraction. What we can assert while remaining within the data of description is only the progressive decrease of bodily forces. This can be brought to the limit and conceived as the ceasing of all conscious living and therefore also of the ego as the pole of identity of this living and of its own faculties.¹²³

Husserl often comes back to the theme of birth and death in the manuscripts — and not by accident. What is involved is the defining of the meaning of monadic finitude while evading a "metaphysical" structuring of the finite. The enigma of finitude obtains within the arch of life between birth and death, within which man becomes in a genesis which is psychical to the extent that it is corporeal. On the one hand there is the problem of an internal consideration of the "parallelism" between the psychical and the corporeal becoming, while on the other we have that relative to the comprehension of the zero point of this "parallelism": birth, in which the theme of the genesis arises for the body as a problem of his *generation*.

IV.

The body is *born* in the corporeal encounter of the father and the mother, and it is a body not only generated but ultimately generating in a new encounter which is originally his. Does this express in that a mere event of the living body, or does it contain a determinate form of pre-meaning to the extent that it is intertwined to the process of the formation of personal-human meanings? If we come upon this risky ground, it is only because we cannot seriously think of an eruption of meaning from what is merely material. On the other hand, there are sufficient indications to hold that matter itself (here we are speaking of living matter) is basic to all of this. Thus, we can understand the motives which push Husserl to repeatedly pose the problem of a phenomenology of instinctive life, and in particular, the body's sexual life. We will attempt to deal with this question very quickly.

In the satisfaction of sexual desire we find the original material inter-subjective encounter which procreates a new living matter: "Sexual instinct, the struggle for the woman. Sexual love as human: not as desire for a material thing,

122. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

but desire for an egological unification, even if, initially, it is above all the unification in a sharing of sexual enjoyment. Internally it is a passionate will to share and to accomplish and furthermore, it is a passionate will permeated by repetition: in the end, but not always, also a sharing of life and a being as parents."¹²⁴

In the internal corporeal co-penetration of the sexual pairing, the distance of the bodies becomes transcended in a new primordial unity: "In the simple fulfillment of the primary mode we never have two separate fulfillments of each drive in the one and in the other primordially, but rather one unity arises through the reciprocal fulfillment of the two primordialities."¹²⁵ In the encounter there is also the reciprocal *recognition*, i.e., self-recognition as sexual body in a determined way, and of the other as an animal of its own species. The real problem lies in understanding how a properly "human" and "rational" world comes to be "progressively" constituted from such a recognition and from the human-animal world of impulses. The basic question that Husserl asks himself in numerous and impartial analyses concerns the possibility of posing the problem of a "universal teleology" which would establish a continuity between what is not yet constituted and what is already constituted. In temporal terms, it is the problem of a teleology whereby the simultaneous intersubjective present in which the awakening monad finds itself could be considered as the "making explicit" of an implicit shared temporality, or, better, of a "pre-temporality": "The new awakening of the ego's as self-sufficient, as the centers of acts which are related in a surrounding world and therefore the awakening of the constitutions of 'beings' and lastly of an horizon of the world as a teleology included in the universal teleology, as a universal intentionality which is always 'prior' in the continual vitality of a unitary and conscious community of monads. This is the community of universally constituted drives which has, corresponding to it, a world which always brings anew the monads to a new formation and to their development. *In this form the totality of the monads gradually comes to self-consciousness* and attains its maximum universality as a human community."¹²⁶ Departing from myself as a "scientific man, I reconsider my and our monadic being, and on the basis of this I systematically go on" – and only on this basis of a conscious and awakened life¹²⁷ – I can legitimately go back to what is not yet constituted. I can regress from the world in which I already am, to the world "before" its constitution, from my temporality and from intersubjective temporality to my intersubjective pre-temporality. At this point, the Husserlian analyses dealing with man's pre-natal state, with the description of the embryonic pre-world, with the gradual constitution of the intersubjective world in the relation of the first infancy to the mother, etc., suddenly come to a halt. Husserl leaves all of this in much uncertainty and incompleteness.¹²⁸

124. Manuscript A-V-10/2, pp. 139-140.

125. Manuscript E-III-5. An English translation of this manuscript has appeared in *Telos* no. 4, Fall 1969, pp. 176-180, under the title "Universal Teleology".

126. "Universal Teleology", *op.cit.*, p. 179.

127. Husserl stresses this particularly in Manuscript C-17-V, p. 33.

128. For further analyses of Husserl's investigations concerning these problems,

Within awakened life we find ourselves in a domain of "human" meanings, but we also know that we are in the continuity of a genesis. That the body is generated locates our own *inheriting ourselves*, whereby we are what we are in our personal history intertwined with the histories which we encounter on the background of a common intersubjective *heritage*: it locates it in an already human, original, and unconscious form of heredity. The *transmitting (tradieren)* in its broadest possible sense, is the form of this genetic-temporal becoming of man in the world. The reciprocal identification of human ego's, which has hitherto been considered in the distinction of its different layers of meaning, here becomes specified, essentially and comprehensively, as *meaningful transmission (Sinnuebertragung)* and *inheritance of meanings (Sinnerbschaft)*. The *transmitting* implies the temporality within which identification obtains as a process. Being in the tradition, in its total meaning, implies inherence to a nexus whereby I am what I am and extracting for me from others my personal being in a necessary reshaping. Human generation is not vacuous, but means to be generated in a possible personal constitution. It is the effective transmission of typical properties and not of the mere monadic egological form of being. The awakening monad contains the transmitted abilities as the possibility of awakening. Yet, it is a new monad with a new *hyle*. The paternal abilities are its own precisely through a joining together which is itself the way of being different through others.¹²⁹

This I which is reflectively discovered as absolute in a living and flowing atemporal present, is man in the world, in finite time, and part of an infinitely repeatable generative nexus. He is a procreated individual. But the procreation is already an *original tradition (Urtradition)*: a transmitting of meaning *which is primary*. All of this obtains on the nocturnal level of biological life, along the lines of whose development we find the "tradition in the sharing of awakened individuals". Only then, in the *Wachheit*, is the transmitting *historical*, i.e., a tradition in the ordinary sense: "The absolute and the individual absolute ego's - each of which is rendered mundane in the finitude of a temporal segment; the finite ego in the chain of its generation, the generative infinity. The original tradition of the generation; those who have been generated who transmit in the *transacting (tradierung)* their individual being to the generated individual; the tradition in the sharing of awakened individuals; what is my own is stamped upon others; identification of individuals; associative products of changing together in the individuals and reciprocal internal transpassing of self and other; therefore, the originally generative heredity of the tradition in the usual sense

see Toulemont, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-88.

129. Cf. Manuscript C-17-V, pp. 31-32. This manuscript is 47 pages long, and was written during the summer of 1930. For the expression "to inherit myself", cf. Manuscript A-V-5, p. 3. It is to be pointed out that Husserl applies the term "*Tradition*" also to the single personal I considered by himself (cf. Manuscript A-V-11, p. 10). Also, occasionally he refers to the personal life of the ego within the limits of birth and death as "*Historie*", "*das Historische*". Cf. Manuscript C-8-I, p. 11.

(historical tradition)."¹³⁰

Let us consider the mode of constitution of awakened life by means of the experience of sleep which is immediately at our disposal. We only know of it in a limited way when we "fall asleep" (*Einschlafen*) and when we "awaken" (*Aufwachen*): the first taken as depotentialization and impoverishment of the life of consciousness in its psychic-corporeal faculties and the second as unexpected recovering of a perceptive field recognized as that which was even "before".¹³¹ Between the two moments there is a pause: sleep. The dream and everything else contained in it – the very time of the dream which, having its own autonomous constitutive structure, is a "different" time – cannot fill this emptiness.¹³² Whatever the case may be with sleeping life,¹³³ the fact remains that in falling asleep I have, e.g., gone to bed and upon awakening I "remember" it: I am *still* lying on the bed. "This 'still,'" says Husserl, "is precisely the problem here."¹³⁴ Memory performs an essential function because through it I "regain the threads" of my temporality and of the temporality of my world by rediscovering, in addition to the pause, the unity of my duration and the identity of what surrounds me. We can generalize this result and claim that: "synthetic identification must come in every time such a spatial present is constituted in living perceptive temporalization and recollection reproduces a similar present which, in terms of the content, is determined and overdetermined as the past. But this means neither 'identity' nor difference and similarity in the ordinary sense of the word."¹³⁵

Awakened life is not a constant and inexhausted being awakened: its constance and that of the world present in it is constituted in the multiplicity of awakened-periods (*Wachperioden*) identified in the temporal synthesis. This result obtains first of all for my own life-domain, but it is already an indication for comprehending the constitutive modality of intersubjective awakened life as the life of the *universum* of awakened subjects and of their intentionally referred world. In this case, the periodically constituted individual singularity of the awakened I is itself a *period* of a broader temporal synthesis. Intersubjective awakened life and the intersubjective world constitute themselves in single-individual periods of birth and death. I awaken and in the genesis of my awakened life, which obtains through and beyond the pauses of sleep, I recognize myself in awakened intersubjectivity "as an infinite system of awakened ego's, which presupposes a system of 'sleeping' and of 'dead' ego's."¹³⁶ Awakened life is essentially transmitted (*tradierte Wachheit*), traditionally constituted and always constitutive of a new tradition. In spite of their fundamentally enigmatic character which renders the analyses exceptionally complex, birth and death must be reintroduced in dealing with the

130. Manuscript C-17-V, pp. 32-33.

131. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

133. For a further elaboration of this theme, see Ida Bona, "L'Interesse e la Fenomenologia del Sonno", in *Aut Aut* n. 64, pp. 362-365.

134. Manuscript C-17-V, p. 6.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

problem of the meaning of individual participation to the intersubjective nexus and of the internal connection between the intersubjective and the personal tradition: thus, birth and death not only cannot be considered as events rupturing intersubjective and interhistorical unity, rather, they must be considered as "connecting members"¹³⁷ through which this unity becomes possible.

My own and the extraneous tradition that I have constituted, are reciprocally and internally bound in the mediation of the intersubjective tradition. Shared life (*Gemeinschaftsleben*) is the life of "persons" in a continuous bond which is both actual and potential. Intersubjective historicity (*intersubjektive Historizität*) is not a "being-next-to-each-other of personal being and becoming, and of individual-personal historicities (tradition), but the unity of connected humanities, of bonds, and bonds of bonds, of multiple intertwinings, of continuously connected mediations which find in this being-related (*Verbundenheit*) their historicity, the unity of a (personally bound) human presence, and of a life in historical community which cannot be broken into a separate singularity of lives."¹³⁸ The form of the *reciprocal motivation* defines the complex relation of continuous mediation between the individual and the group. In its concrete temporal being the individual is in a tradition emerging from that of the community of which he is a part and which he himself co-constitutes: "Man is not only in the community, but to the extent that he develops in the internal sharing and he forms for and with it in reciprocal motivation, hence to the extent that from time to time he has become, he carried within himself the genesis arisen from the community, or, what is the same thing, he intentionally carries with himself his human educators. Naturally, this also concerns the formation through the tradition, i.e., the influx (the so-called *Nachwirkung*) of those men of the same humanity who have lived in earlier times."¹³⁹

Events such as birth, illness, and death, my having been generated, the fact that I was born once and that I will die some day, present themselves in my experience. I also experience the elders who were born before me and I can foresee that after me and my generation other generations will follow. I recognize myself to be in a generative nexus infinitely open towards the past and towards the future. The world I now perceive in the renewed synthesis of my experiences — and which appears as such not only to me, but also to those who have grown up with me — is that same unique world recognizable in the infinite trespassing of generations. On the other hand, if there is a unity of my personal life encapsulated within the limits of birth and death, this unity is already surpassed and included in a broader unity of my generation as well as in that of the generations that have preceded and will follow me. I comprehend the unity of a history and of a tradition, which is both my history as well as the history of my generation, of my people, etc., moving towards flowing unities always

137. For an elaboration of *Brueckenglieder*, see Manuscript C-17-V, p. 17.

138. Manuscript A-V-7, p. 4.

139. Manuscript C-11-III, p. 8; this manuscript is 21 pages long, and was written in 1934. *Nachwirkung* indicates the effect which remains even after the cause has ceased to be.

broad and more comprehensive.¹⁴⁰

By elaborating the being of the subject as *history* and *relation* we can also correctly grasp the theme of *culture*, under which title we had originally subsumed every human-intersubjective meaning in general. This happens after we have forced ourselves to understand the meaning of the encounter even in the *first Einfuehlung*.¹⁴¹ The very living body – which seemed to present itself in a kind of immediacy – has turned out to be both generating and generated in the human form of *transmitting*¹⁴² in the generative mediation.

The community of which man is a genetic part is also an “animal” community. Considered from this viewpoint, man is merely the animal species “homo”. Yet the properly human form of generation, as the transmission of meanings, is not purely natural, but *natural-personal*. Thus, the horizon of sharing within which man finds himself is a personal-cultural horizon of “people”.¹⁴³ This is what distinguishes the human from the shared animal life: the animal is also in a community and in a genesis through which one can relatively trace a “spiritual” development from the embryonic beginnings all the way up to maturity and a relative “cultural” domain. But the animal can never become a person: its surrounding world is never primarily cultural and its genetic becoming is never *history*.

Only *man* is a historical being who contains history, makes history, and can become history as a being who realizes himself in his meaningfully productive temporal functioning: “Man as a person is the subject of a cultural world which is the correlate of the total personal community in which every person knows himself in relation to the cultural human world in which he lives. The animal does not consciously live in a cultural world. This evidently implies man is an historical being. He lives within a ‘humanity’ which is in historical becoming, in

140. Manuscript C-11-I, p. 25.

141. For the expression “first *Einfuehlung*”, see Manuscript K-III.

142. Even if it is impossible here to deal with the vast and complex phenomenological theme of *Kultur*, it seems proper to emphasize that it cannot be resolved in a mere static description. It presupposes the consideration of the genesis of the type, the clarification of the way whereby, *within the totality of the productive manifestations of a determined historical life* it has been constituted and it has become valid. This makes possible a consideration of the meaning which does not proceed to depart by the obvious assumption of its “validity”, but which is able to recognize it as the “validity of this present”, to go back to genetic-historical motivations that have led to its sedimentation. Of the proposal implicit here attributing to socio-historical research a new task of revelation and foundation, there is in Husserl at least the presupposition, even if this aspect has been generally ignored by phenomenological literature. In this respect, the biased opinion according to which Husserl’s perspective necessarily implied no interest for history has been particularly damaging. Yet, the final point of arrival of the long Husserlian path – when the first phenomenological password “*zu den Sachen selbst*” translates in the return to the *Lebenswelt* – is the recognition of the life of history in its complex dialectic as the ultimate foundation since in it every human and non-human meaning has its transcendental constitutive source.

143. Cf. Manuscript C-11-III, p. 11.

the becoming which makes history. This humanity is subjectivity as the carrier of the historical world. The expression does not mean life historically alive and constitutive of history, but the correlative surrounding world as a human surrounding world which, starting from man, from total humanity, it carries within itself spiritual meaning as ontic properties of realities and of their ontic historicity, and it has this meaning from human operating: from the interests, purposes, and systems of human purposes."¹⁴⁴

Man's historicity is defined by his belonging in the world as uniquely individuated in the intersubjective mediation, and as total individual and shared *praxis*. Between the individual and the group, group and group, world and individual, and world and group, there is a *real reciprocal dialectic*, whose meaning must be periodically determined.

VI.

Now "I can" turn to this or that and go on with the vision and with the description. This "turning towards" is already a mode of activity,¹⁴⁵ but subjective practicality does not end in this contemplation: "Yet, the I is essentially active in another sense also. Starting from itself, through its own activity, the I communicates a modified meaning to what it experiences as being 'in the world', already with a determined meaning of being which it has because of the past (eventually, rather, necessarily through apperception), outlining the future of identical being."¹⁴⁶ Through my *praxis* I penetrate the already-given and I modify its being-so-already-become, in its form and in its eventual purpose: I produce a new effect (*Wirkung*). The world is not only what it is: its reality is *actuality* (*Wirklichkeit*). It is a permanently sedimented product of a concrete operating past. This means that, to the extent that it is present to me which I am *now*, the *I-can*, it is essentially a *practical field for a possible actualization*: "Objectified subjectivity as human subjectivity in the transcendental self-constitution is in the world and, as such, not only does it come to know the world, but it shapes a world which already is. The world periodically given as an already apperceived world with a meaning of being starting from the subjective constitutive past, the world already-given to experience is not permanent actuality, but the practical field of realization."¹⁴⁷

Praxis leads back to man's corporeal materiality. In this respect, primordiality must be understood as a system of the *I-can*. Through his body, the *I-can* performs on the surrounding world a constant and concrete reshaping. He can derive meaning from *mere nature* and he historicizes himself and nature. Ultimately, he is man-in-the-world in a human-world.

Living material corporeality comes into question here since *praxis* is *first* of all motivated by it: *the I-can is originally a response to need*.¹⁴⁸ In my concrete

144. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

145. Cf. Manuscript C-17-II, p. 14; this manuscript is 21 pages long, and was written between 1930 and 1931.

146. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 12. See also Manuscript C-17-V, p. 25.

148. The problem of a phenomenology of need is clearly posed by Husserl, but

everyday life I am in need: everyday I *care (sorge)* for the satisfaction of my hunger and I am worried (*Vorsage*) about my tomorrow, since today's need appears as periodically repeated and as due to reappear: "Mere daily satisfactions have no permanent result. The appropriation and the eating of food produces its own consumption."¹⁴⁹

"At the beginning" there is nothing but the body's unconditional hunger and the hunt for food for immediate satisfaction: the hunt is the body's original project while the food is that towards which he is already an I-can and through which he can remain one. Precisely to the extent that the threat of unsatisfied hunger is directed to the original possibility of the body, it is a threat of *death*, in front of which existence becomes anguished: "Hunger which remains unsatisfied: – the I's impotence to act: not only not-wanting-to, not only 'occasionally' unsatisfied desire – in the game of the satisfied and unsatisfied desire, hindered in its free realization – but *anguish* of being. Desperation in front of the not-being-so and of the not-being-able-to-be-again. The anguish of life, the 'anguish of death' – without representation of death. 'I fail' in front of hunger."¹⁵⁰ Then, the *other* who is between my hunger and my food for the satisfaction of his hunger becomes my *mortal enemy*: "The others and the struggle with others – in the threats of life: 'struggle for life and death'. Struggle with others for one's own being – to determine who dies of hunger for lack of nutrition – which becomes defense; my unconditioned will (for my 'being') in conflict with the other's will: I direct myself against him in his unconditioned will, against him with unconditioned hatred. The other is my mortal enemy."¹⁵¹

The mortal struggle with the other ends in the evolution of the hunt for food in a shared and productive *praxis*. In the immediacy of need I recognize otherness in the possible sharing of his *praxis* with mine for the satisfaction of the common poverty.¹⁵² Being thus becomes reshaped and concretely elaborated in the way it better meets need:¹⁵³ the *humanization of the world* proceeds constantly within "nature's" already real being in view of the satisfaction of needs which are first immediate and then mediate.¹⁵⁴ Thus, it becomes possible to pose the tasks of *praxis* which, from the immediate interest of hunger, come to the solution of the periodicity of need through the

his analyses in this area, besides being highly fragmentary, do not seem to go beyond certain vague suggestions. Yet, for those who think that there are good reasons today to re-examine the Husserlian discourse, they raise interesting points. Cf. Enzo Paci, "Nuove Ricerche Fenomenologiche", *op.cit.*, which re-examines the phenomenology of needs and poses problems that now belong to a new history of phenomenology.

149. Manuscript A-V-5, p. 169.

150. Manuscript A-V-7, p. 78; this manuscript is 180 pages long and was written between 1920 and 1932.

151. *Ibid.*

152. Cf. Manuscript A-V-5, pp. 176-177. For the theme of identification in *praxis*, see Manuscript A-V-6, p. 20.

153. Cf. Manuscript A-V-5, pp. 161-162.

154. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

constitution of the *everyday* permanence,¹⁵⁵ of *useful means*¹⁵⁶ and goods. Yet, along the lines here barely and doubtfully outlined of a phenomenology of need and of *praxis*, we must also consider the failure of what motivates permanence. "Wealth" can become the end in itself of *accumulation* (*Ansammlung, Vermehrung*): to always accumulate more and more money like accumulating more and more stamps,¹⁵⁷ and to gain more and more power as a good and an enjoyment which finds its meaning and end only in the *always more*: "Power is always more power, and over always broader human groups. Certainly, individual domination and control is an enjoyment, but a permanent good is to have power, to have the individual as a slave (here, without having utility in mind): to dominate a community, a group, to have a constant mastery over that and eventually to constantly extend one's domain of mastery *ad infinitum*."¹⁵⁸

The I's original practicality comprehensively defines existence (*Existenz*) as life and history: the subject existing in its constant present¹⁵⁹ is first of all an *I-can*. It is always alive in the opening of the possible and in being able to realize the project of my living, I now live in the *hope* (*Hoffnung*) of continuing on living and in the *care* (*Sorge*) turned to resolving the *mode* of the projected possibility: "Every life in hope is life in *care*, and vice versa, if *care* of existence concerns the *how* and not the *what* of existence."¹⁶⁰ The threat is originally turned to the I-can: normal life is always threatened in the process of its multiple projects or even in its own being able to be again. Death is the limit of the negativity of life because it means the total failure of the possible, indifference to care and the darkening of hope. In the face of mortal threat, in the absolute no longer being able to, there is the *anguish for existence* (*Angst um die Existenz*). But the negativity of life is present in every determined desperation of the possible. Above all, it is present every time that man is deprived of the *work* which is properly his own: his *praxis*.¹⁶¹

Husserl questions the life of stolen labor by using two examples: the life of the "beggar", and that of the "prisoner". The beggar lives by begging, in total subordination to someone else's work. He is, or he may become, a "professional" beggar, a "sponger", thus constituting for himself a domain of *care* and of *hope*: a possibility of life. But it may also be that he cannot find work, "as during our periods of unemployment". He is still "alive": but how can his life be called a "life"?¹⁶²

The "prisoner" maintains himself in "positivity" if he can hope to gain his freedom and to reconstruct his life through his work. Let us instead suppose that

155. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

156. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

157. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

158. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

159. It needs to be stressed that the fundamental theme of the *present* coincides with that of *praxis*.

160. Manuscript E-III-6, p. 2; this manuscript is 16 pages long and was written in May-June 1933.

161. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

162. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

this is precluded from him and that he is condemned for life: "If 'as punishment' he cannot do anything in a solitary cell, or if he is forced to an activity which is meaningless for him, e.g., such as unravelling wool and similar activities, without him deriving from it any real possibility, isn't such an imprisoned life inhuman and radically de-humanizing?"¹⁶³ The beggar and the prisoner are two sides of the same coin: deprived of their own possibility, and yet in the positivity of life, they are men in a state of de-humanization: they are living in death. If the unemployed ends up by resolving his own life begging, the prisoner, robbed of the sense of free ownership of his work, cannot but *beg* his possibility of life by *inventing a game*: "If in such a situation man invents games which keep him busy, and if he voluntarily finds himself in them, so as to 'maintain himself' for them and always again for them: would this be a human life? Isn't this, so to say, a way of begging satisfaction out of life, instead of arriving at a truly human mode of being?"¹⁶⁴

By publicizing these last fragments, we believe we are able to conclude this exposition: it has simply attempted to shed light on the horizon of problems disclosed by the phenomenological position of the theme of subjective otherness. At any rate, it is clear that the path we have followed remains, in its possible ramifications and in its final meaning, completely open and unfinished.

163. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

164. *Ibid.*, p. 6.